more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 9188

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic ]

Full Idea

Gödel proved the completeness of standard formalizations of first-order logic, including Frege's original one. However, an implication of his famous theorem on the incompleteness of arithmetic is that second-order logic is incomplete.

Gist of Idea

Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete

Source

report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1

Book Ref

'Philosophy 2: further through the subject', ed/tr. Grayling,A.C. [OUP 1998], p.136


A Reaction

This must mean that it is impossible to characterise arithmetic fully in terms of first-order logic. In which case we can only characterize the features of abstract reality in general if we employ an incomplete system. We're doomed.


The 33 ideas with the same theme [logic extending variables to predicates and relations]:

Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro]
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp]
Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking]
Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
Only second-order logic can capture mathematical structure up to isomorphism [Mayberry]
Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine]
Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro]
Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro]
In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro]
Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro]
If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro]
Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro]
Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy]
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
Semantics must precede proof in higher-order logics, since they are incomplete [Read]
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
Second-order logic presupposes a set of relations already fixed by the first-order domain [Lavine]
Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
email your comments